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Abstract Localism is an active political strategy, developed in a period of austerity by
the UK’s Coalition Government as a justification for the restructuring of state–civil society
relationships. The deprived neighbourhood has long been a site for service delivery and a
scale for intervention and action, giving rise to a variety of forms of neighbourhood
governance. Prior international comparative research indicated convergence with the US,
given the rise of the self-help conjuncture and the decline of neighbourhood governance
as a medium of regeneration. The subsequent shift in the UK model from ‘big’ to ‘small
state’ localism and deficit-reducing cuts to public expenditure confirm these trends,
raising questions about the forms of neighbourhood governance currently being
established, the role being played by local and central government, and the implications
for neighbourhood regeneration. Two emerging forms of neighbourhood governance are
examined in two urban local authorities and compared with prior forms examined in earlier
research in the case study sites. The emerging forms differ significantly in their design and
purpose, but as both are voluntary and receive no additional funding, better organised
and more affluent communities are more likely to pursue their development. While it is still
rather early to assess the capacity of these forms to promote neighbourhood
regeneration, the potential in a period of austerity appears limited. Reduced funding for
local services increases the imperative to self-help, while rights to local voice remain
limited and the emerging forms provide little scope to influence (declining) local services
and (still centralised) planning decisions, especially in neighbourhoods with regeneration
needs that are likely to lack the requisite capacities, particularly stores of linking social
capital. Initial conclusions suggest greater polarity and the further containment of deprived
neighbourhoods.
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INTRODUCTION
Localism is a contested and malleable
notion, which has been appropriated by
successive public policy agendas. The use
of the neighbourhood as a site for service
delivery and scale for intervention and
action has given rise to a variety of forms
of governance.1 Previous international
comparative research on neighbourhood
governance revealed that Bristol showed
signs of convergence with the self-help
conjuncture evident in Baltimore in the
US.2 The subsequent shift in the national
model from ‘big state’ solutions towards
‘small state localism’ verifies these trends
by confirming the neighbourhood as a site
and scale, but with an emphasis on
voluntary action by actors within it, rather
than intervention by actors beyond. This
raises questions about the forms of
neighbourhood governance being
established, the role being played by local
and central government, and the
implications for neighbourhood
regeneration, given the viability and
actuality of ‘small state’ localism.
This paper first considers localism as an
active political strategy and explores its
development and current incarnation. It
then explains the research approach before
setting out the former and emerging
forms of neighbourhood governance
associated with the ‘big state’ and
subsequent ‘small state’ localism agendas,
illustrated via two case study cities, which
include consideration of the early stages of
implementation of emerging forms.
Research findings regarding the role of
central and local government, and the
practical regeneration implications for
deprived neighbourhoods are then




Successive national governments over the
past 30 years have recognised and used the
value of ‘localism’. As Clarke argues: ‘the
political rationales for localism are not
based wholly on privatism or community
values or even necessarily locational logics;
they also include the instrumental use of
localism as a political strategy’.3
The roots of its usage lie in reforms to
counter the centralisation of the post-war
welfare state, commenced by the Thatcher
Conservative Government of the 1980s.
Central–local government relations
became increasingly antagonistic as
neoliberal market discipline was
introduced into public service delivery.
Such ‘hollowing out of the state’4
conceptualised government’s role as
strategic overseer, placing its trust locally
in agencies and private actors rather than
local government or communities, as with
the ‘parachuting in’ of Urban
Development Corporations to implement
area renewal. While subsequent
neighbourhood regeneration programmes
such as the Single Regeneration Budget
(SRB; launched in 1994 by the Major
Conservative Government) and New Deal
for Communities (NDC, launched in
1998 by New Labour) increasingly
required partnership with communities
and other stakeholders, these were
critiqued for the extent to which they
were ‘steered’ by central government.5 The
£2bn NDC programme targeted 39 of
England’s most deprived neighbourhoods
to produce a ‘local response’ to five
indicators of social deprivation related to
mainstream services.6 Communities were
‘shoehorned’ into the initiative, which
superimposed ideas about local area
organisation, funding and delivery onto
local political contexts.7
The first New Labour Government
(1997–2001) retained local government in
a strict delivery relationship with the
centre, where it could ‘earn autonomy’
through improved performance.8 A
renewed emphasis on localism gradually
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emerged during the 2000s, as local
government was required to work in
partnership with communities and other
‘stakeholders’, echoing the approach
pursued by regeneration initiatives since
the 1990s. The outcomes of local
government reform, including community
strategies, Local Strategic Partnerships and
‘place shaping’,9 were termed the ‘new
localism’10 and owed much to the
perceived benefits of ‘networked
community governance’,11 such as locally
distinctive policy making by those with
greater contextual understanding. But it
was ‘new’ because it was set in a ‘context
of national framework setting and
funding’.10 Subsequent calls for ‘double
devolution’,12 from central government to
local government to neighbourhoods,
prefigured many of the elements of the
2010-elected Conservative–Liberal
Coalition Government’s Localism Act.13
Continuities are also evident in the
Coalition Government’s emphasis on
self-help, which draws from the increased
prominence over the past 20 years of the
potential for reinvigorating civil society,
expressed through volunteering, political
participation, asset ownership and service
delivery,2 manifested in regeneration
initiatives’ emphasis on the capacity
building of communities.
But significant ideological differences
remain. The coalition’s criticisms of New
Labour for extending ‘big government’ are
drawn from the libertarian ‘crowding out’
thesis,14 which posits that state action
suppresses civil society vitality and
responsible voluntarism. Conservative
policy, therefore, retains the view that the
‘big state’ undermines self-help. Thatcher
espoused self-reliance; since 2010, the
emphasis has been on community and
voluntary action. This is in significant
contrast to New Labour’s ‘big state’
approach to deprived neighbourhoods,
which involved committing large amounts
of resource to targeted initiatives such as
NDC and Neighbourhood Management
Pathfinders (explained below), in
combination with national standards,
which attempted to address equity of
service provision.15
Thus, while central governments of
different hues have capitalised on the
normative appeal of localism to further
their political strategies, there are
ideological differences in how ‘the
strategic dilemmas integral to governing’16
have been handled. New Labour’s
commitment to localism was constrained
by its greater commitment to principles of
standardisation and equity rather than
those of diversity and local control.17 In
contrast, the Coalition Government
appears unconcerned by the ‘postcode
lottery’:
‘Decentralisation will allow different
communities to do different things in
different ways to meet their different needs.
This will certainly increase variety in
service provision. But far from being
random — as the word “lottery” implies —
such variation will reflect the conscious
choices made by local people.’18
The links that New Labour made between
service outcomes and local resource
availability (with area-based initiatives
targeting ‘special resource’ to areas of
deprivation), and between service
outcomes and local service provider
competence (with performance
management regimes seeking to assure
baseline standards) have been decoupled
by the Coalition Government. Local
variation in service provision is now
presented as an outcome of local
priorities, expressed via community
governance structures, heralding the end
of neighbourhood-targeted regeneration
initiatives and ushering in community
self-reliance to ‘step into the breach’. But
the Coalition Government still needs to
make use of control technologies, but
favours more explicitly neoliberal
Bailey and Pill
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economic incentives to govern local
conduct. Communities that ‘choose’ to
allow development can gain the New
Homes Bonus (matching Council Tax
from new houses for six years) and a
greater portion of the Community
Infrastructure Levy (CIL; paid by
developers in return for planning
permission). But the extent to which these
are ‘choices’ is questionable in the context
of austerity-era local government funding
cuts.
Localism is therefore an active political
strategy, which emerges not only from
normative concerns about central–local
relations, but as part of a continuing,
negotiated process of state rescaling,19
which invents and transfers responsibilities
to place-based communities. It is used by
the Coalition Government as a way to
justify the restructuring of state–civil
society relationships based on normative
notions of shared responsibility and
community, which are manifested in
neighbourhood governance. Power needs
to be handed back to ‘citizens,
communities and local government’,
because only when ‘people and
communities are given more power and
take more responsibility can we achieve
fairness and opportunity for all’.20 Much
debate has ensued about the extent to
which its small state variant reflects a
genuine commitment to localism, or
whether the emphasis on voluntarism acts
as a smokescreen for deficit-reducing cuts
in public expenditure.21 Certainly, the
ideological shift has only been exacerbated
by economic circumstances, which have
bolstered the perceived inevitability of
state withdrawal under austerity politics.
DATA AND METHODS
The research, conducted in 2012, used a
qualitative, semi-structured
interview-based methodology combined
with a documentary review of secondary
data. The two city local authorities, Bristol
and Westminster, were selected as case
studies because they had been the subject
of previous research regarding
neighbourhood governance prior to the
May 2010 election of the Coalition
Government (Bristol research conducted
in 2008,2 Westminster research in early
201022). Returning to these sites enabled
‘before and after’ comparison, capturing
former/ongoing and emerging forms of
neighbourhood governance, albeit early in
the implementation process. These prior
links also eased access to the eight
respondents with whom interviews were
conducted. Respondents were selected via
purposive sampling to include local
council officers and members whose brief
encompassed neighbourhood governance,





The heritage of the ‘big state’ approach to
deprived neighbourhoods was evident in
both cities in the form of neighbourhood
management. This approach, which seeks
more effective and responsive local service
delivery, was promoted by New Labour
via a seven-year national Pathfinder
programme (launched in 2001), which
funded 35 area-based partnerships at
£3.5m each for their dedicated officer
teams and facilitation of community
engagement.23 Each Pathfinder was
managed by a board, consisting of local
authority officers and members,
representatives of service providers and
residents, which determined local priority
issues and developed a neighbourhood
action plan to address these. In contrast to
the NDC’s more holistic regeneration
ambitions (each partnership received
£50m over ten years), neighbourhood
management focused on influencing
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services with the best ‘fit’ at
neighbourhood level, in particular ‘crime
and grime’, housing and public health.
The approach was adopted by local
authorities, but often without the
dedicated, and costly, area-based staff teams
of the Pathfinders, and can be
characterised as an attempt to gauge
resident priorities regarding service
provision.
Both cities had experience of previous
initiatives in neighbourhood
management. While Bristol’s ongoing
approach operated city-wide, Westminster
had a strategy to target the most deprived
areas. Bristol City Council established
Neighbourhood Partnerships in 2008,
each covering two to three wards, with
populations ranging from 20,000 to
40,000 residents, and incorporating the
governance structures of former, more
costly and targeted initiatives, such as the
‘Community at Heart’ NDC.2 Since the
election of the coalition, the partnerships
have been cited as evidence of
‘embedding localism’, to ‘enable the
dispersal of power to neighbourhoods,
and to enable everyone to have a voice
and to be heard’.24 The partnerships are
supported by (virtual rather than
area-based) service provider officer teams
and do not have additional resources.
Elements of existing council budgets,
including highway maintenance and
minor traffic works, have been devolved
to the partnerships, with final
decision-making power vested in local
councillors. When asked about the size of
the budget devolved, a council member
commented, ‘we’ve never set upon a
figure … if you include officer time and
influencing budgets it’s huge’.
In Westminster, the city had previously
pursued a deprived ward-targeted model
of neighbourhood management through
four Local Area Renewal Partnerships
(LARPs), created in 2003. These derived
in turn from neighbourhood forums
established by a local development trust
using SRB monies, and one was
subsequently awarded Pathfinder status by
central government. The LARPs operated
closely according to the Pathfinder model,
with a board and wider forums open to all
residents. Their funding (at between
£180,000 and £400,000 a year) enabled
area-based staff teams plus some limited




The research revealed two emergent
forms: Civil Parish Councils (CPCs),
evident in one city; and Neighbourhood
Forums (NFs) for planning, evident in
both. Each form is designed for different
purposes and has differing enabling
legislation, constitution, powers and
funding (as set out in Table 1). The
enabling legislation devolving powers to
local government to create CPCs
pre-dates the Localism Act. This option
was pursued in the case examined below
once its funding was cut in 2010,
highlighting that ‘big state’ era legislation
encouraging localism has been reaffirmed
by its small state variant, with the CPC’s
funding model through a Council Tax
precept offering an option in the absence
of additional government resource. Both
cities had emergent NFs, a new form of
neighbourhood governance enabled by
the Localism Act, whereby (in the
absence of CPCs) NFs have the right to
prepare Neighbourhood Development
Plans (NDPs) for designated
Neighbourhood Planning Areas (NPAs).
The key differences between the two
forms are that CPCs have much broader
powers (including the option of
preparing an NDP) and levy a Council
Tax precept, while NFs only have powers
to produce NDPs and very limited
funding to do so.
Bailey and Pill
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CIVIL PARISH COUNCILS
In Bristol, council respondents were in
agreement that ‘it’s patently not
somewhere we can go at the moment’. In
Westminster, the CPC campaign for
Queen’s Park ward stemmed from the
area’s legacy as a LARP, for which funding
was cut by the City Council in 2010
following the general and local elections.
The campaign group (comprising a core
of resident activists active in the
neighbourhood forum) sought the
Council Tax precept enabled by CPC
designation as a means of maintaining the
infrastructure of a neighbourhood office
and staff, which had received £180,000
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Table 1: Two emergent forms of neighbourhood governance
Legislation Constitution Powers Funding
Civil Parish Council or Neighbourhood or Community Council
Civil Parish Council or Neighbourhood or Community Council
Elected en bloc for a
4-year term.
Minimum of 5 elected
members. Larger CPCs
may be divided into
wards, with separate
elections for each ward. 
A minimum of 21
people who live, work
or are councillors in a
neighbourhood (without
an existing CPC), who
are approved by the LA
as the NF for a defined
and pre-designated
NPA.
There must be a written
constitution and
membership must be
open to those who live
or work in the area. 
NFs can prepare NDPs,
which have regard to
national planning policy
and are in conformity with
other statutory plans such
as the LDF. The NDP is
considered by an
Inspector and must be









LA required to fund
consultation to establish the
NF and associated NPA,
and subsequently to fund




£5–20k from central govt to
support plan preparation.
From 2013/14, up to £100k
per LA available from
central govt to support up
to 20 




Additional powers can be
transferred by the LA.





CPCs can prepare plans
and design statements to
inform the statutory
planning process. Since






Precept on Council Tax in
CPC area. Annual budget
agreed at an annual CPC
meeting.
Some employ a full- or






Infrastructure Levy (CIL): 15
per cent capped at £100
per dwelling; or 25 per cent
uncapped if have produced
an NDP.
Local Government and








(2007) extended right to
London and devolved
powers to LAs to carry
out community
governance reviews,
which can also be
triggered by a petition
signed by sufficient
electors. Act also gives
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funding a year. The intent was that precept
income would be supplemented by grant
aid for activities, while the focus would be
to continue service influencing, with a
campaign group member commenting:
‘I’m very sure if there wasn’t the
economic imperative I don’t know that
we would have been going down this
route … of setting up a parish council. We
would have continued with the funny
money coming in from government’.
The requisite petition triggered a
‘community governance review’ by the
City Council,25 conducted across the local
authority area in accord with central
government guidance.26 The review, led by
the Council’s Planning Department,
encompassed not only whether to
establish CPCs, but whether to introduce
any other ‘new community governance
arrangements such as NFs’.27 While
campaigners recognised the council’s need
to plan ahead, given ‘the potential for
hundreds of little groups each clamouring
for a referendum on a neighbourhood
plan’, the emphasis on neighbourhood
planning was felt to be a ‘bit of a snub …
the reason they’re doing this governance
review is because of the 2007 Act, not
because of the Localism Act’. Tensions
between the two forms of neighbourhood
governance were also evident when the
campaign group was encouraged by
council officers to consider becoming an
NF, as an NDP could take a ‘holistic
approach’. But the CPC ‘allowed us to do
a lot more’ and the group had ‘long
experience of developing a regeneration
social plan’ and ‘were very clear of the
difference between the two’. The
community governance review included a
question, ‘Do you think it is fair to have
different forms of community governance
across Westminster?’,25 which prompted a
campaign group member to comment:
‘They didn’t choose to ask the question,
did they think it was fair that some areas
were so disadvantaged compared to
others? And did they need special
measures?’
Responses to the review were largely in
favour. The council conducted a postal
referendum ‘to ensure that the proposals
for Queen’s Park have the clear support of
residents who will be asked to pay an
additional levy’,28 the results of which
were also in favour of setting up the CPC.
The council subsequently professed
support, in line with central government
policy direction: ‘For Westminster to have
the first parish council in London for 50
years [is] a fitting endorsement of the
government’s ambitions for localism and
neighbourhood engagement.’28
The council decided to combine
elections to the new body with the next
local government elections in May 2014,
to enable an estimated cost saving of
£7,000.27 While the campaign group had
envisaged elections two years earlier, a
member explained that the urgency had
reduced because of the area’s selection as
one of ten central government
neighbourhood-level pilots for
Community Budget Plans,29 focused on
bringing relevant services and residents
together to co-design local public services
for families at risk. This was described by
one campaigner as providing ‘a fantastic
training ground and a relationship builder’
prior to the CPC’s formal establishment.
NEIGHBOURHOOD FORUMS FOR
PLANNING
In both cities, local government attention
was focused on the neighbourhood
planning aspects of the Localism Act.
Three Bristol neighbourhood groups were
part of the national neighbourhood
planning pilot scheme (designated as
‘Front Runners’) set up by central
government. The groups applied for their
formal NPA and NF designations in May
2012. Two of the three groups were
awarded the designations needed to work
Bailey and Pill
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towards creating NDPs, one was not.
One of Bristol’s front runner areas had
a significant history of deprivation and
regeneration need, described by a council
officer as ‘the community that’s been
“done to” so many times’. Residents had
previously worked with significant council
input preparing a vision document. The
neighbourhood planning process was
intended to build from this work, but a
council member felt that the
neighbourhood planning process had
circumvented previous efforts,
commenting that the NF ‘have an idea of
what they want to see going forward, but
they have no capacity for writing a plan
… and it’s just not feasible’. A council
officer agreed on the lack of capacity,
explaining that the NF was ‘ignoring the
challenging sites … because they know
that the immediate people around here
would object’. The officer explained that 
‘there’s community tension in the way in
which things are being worked through
the neighbourhood planning process that
wasn’t there with the vision because it is
focusing on land and not on services’.
In preparation for the roll-out of
neighbourhood planning, the council had
produced guidance on how
neighbourhood groups can formally seek
NPA designation to enable work and
resource planning, as well as to ‘negotiate
with people or get them to negotiate
among themselves to cluster into more
effective groups’, given the potential for
different groups wanting to have a say on
the same or overlapping areas. Following
designation, a two-tier system of council
support for NFs had been proposed, with
areas receiving greater support if they are
‘in the 10 to 20 per cent most deprived’,
and are identified as regeneration areas
with development potential in the Local
Development Framework (LDF). By
mid-2013, five NPAs and four associated
NFs had been designated in the city.30
In Westminster, the city council
recommended the city’s amenity societies,
18 organisations that ‘play an active role in
shaping the special character of
Westminster’s neighbourhoods’, as ‘broadly
represent[ing] the most suitable areas for
undertaking neighbourhood planning’.27
By mid-2013, 20 applications for
‘neighbourhood area’ (NPA) designation
had been submitted to the council, several
covering overlapping areas not
co-terminus with amenity society areas.
These included an application for Queen’s
Park ward from the shadow CPC,
operating prior to its formal creation
when it will have the right to prepare an
NDP for the area, as well as applications
concerning two other former LARP areas.
Four NPAs had been designated where
boundary issues had been resolved, and
there were no overlapping applications,
three of which were also defined as
Business Areas.31
Both councils had expended effort to
prepare for neighbourhood planning. The
resourcing implications were significant,
because of a council’s obligations to
undertake consultations for NPA
applications and for community groups to
become NFs, to bear the costs of NDP
public examinations, as well as to provide
information and support to groups
seeking to engage in the process. In
Bristol, a council officer expressed
concern about ‘how we balance our
resources which are less than they were 18
months ago … in the last financial year
we spent more than £15,000 just on staff
time’ (for neighbourhood planning). The
respondent expressed interest in creating
CPCs, owing to their ability to levy a
Council Tax precept:
‘It’s interesting … that where our people
are really struggling because they haven’t
any source of finance it doesn’t seem to be
quite the same in the parished areas because
… with a year’s notice they can get their
hands on some money.’
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ROLE OF LOCAL AND CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT
The key shaping role played by local
government in neighbourhood
governance is unsurprising. But the way in
which central government priorities
continue to take precedence is
noteworthy, particularly given the focus of
attention in both cities on preparing for
neighbourhood planning, which has
significant resourcing implications for local
government as well as making huge
demands on the volunteers engaged.
Planning system reforms illustrate that,
despite a Conservative preference for
‘presumed autonomy’,32 compromises
have been necessary. While the preceding
government’s ‘over-engineered’ approach
to planning was criticised as stifling
innovation and depriving communities of
democracy,33 the Localism Act diluted
more radical policy ideas, given concerns
about the planning system’s ability to
pursue the public good in the absence of
strategic control.34 The range of powers
reserved to the secretary of state led to the
Localism Bill being denounced as the
‘centralism bill’.35 The NDPs retained
their proposed statutory status, but were
required to conform with local plans,
meaning that local authorities retain
control over the quantity and spatial
distribution of development.34 In Bristol,
concerns were expressed about the
additionality of neighbourhood planning,
with an officer respondent explaining that
one front runner was effectively producing
a ‘refinement of our site allocations
document’.
At the same time, both cities
demonstrate that central government
policy is ill-considered, patchy and in
practice left to local government to sort
out, complicating implementation. Both
councils have expended effort in attempts
to prepare for neighbourhood planning by
gauging initial interest among community
groups, given the significant resourcing
implications. But the process is steered by
local government, with Westminster using
the existing network of amenity societies
as a suggested framework, and Bristol not
awarding the requisite designations to one
front runner, despite a council officer
commenting that ‘the designation
requirements are so loose that it would be
very difficult not to confer
neighbourhood planning status’. Both
councils were having to prepare to
perform a brokering role between and
among diverse communities, in particular
regarding the designation of NPAs and
NFs, complicated especially in Westminster
by the plethora of existing area-based
organisations and interests, including
Business Improvement Districts and the
Royal Parks. The Localism Act legislation,
lack of adequate guidance and parallel
legislation on CPCs has caused major
problems. A Westminster officer
commented that ‘[neighbourhood]
planning does work better in rural areas
… an existing parish council, a village
with clear boundaries, many fewer
applications … fewer people’, a sentiment
echoed by a Bristol council member: ‘My
feeling on all of this stuff is that it was
designed for a village with two hundred
people. And that’s been the whole of the
Localism Act. It was not designed for an
urban context.’
Such critique of policy’s ability to deal
with radical plurality highlights the
challenge of achieving a sense of
community, one of the conditions
identified as necessary for community
governance.10 Another of the conditions,
requisite capacity, is also a significant
obstacle for the realisation of
neighbourhood planning, as evident in the
case of Bristol’s front runners. And, as a
council officer explained, NDPs as a form
of statutory planning need to ‘take
account of viability and deliverability …
we can’t put a constraint in effect on an
area that’s not deliverable’. Therefore the
Bailey and Pill
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potential power of NFs has been curtailed
by the pursuit of national priorities,
reflected in local plans and fiscal
incentives, and by the shaping role of the
local authority, which is having to choose
where to focus effort and resource. This
has resulted in fragmentation in terms of
the areas being prioritised by local
authorities, and in terms of who engages
at neighbourhood level. While such
fragmentation can be presented as an
outcome of local priorities, it is also
evidence of increasing polarity between
those areas with and without the actors
and capacities in place and market interest
in their development.
REGENERATION IMPLICATIONS
Other forms of neighbourhood
governance have been sidelined, with
prior structures adapting where possible to
the newly available policy options, such as
the Queen’s Park CPC campaign founded
by those formerly engaged in the LARP.
Bristol’s deprived neighbourhood ‘front
runner’ had been subject to a prior
‘visioning’ initiative, felt to have been
bypassed by the neighbourhood planning
process. Tensions were evident because of
the perceived need for a more holistic
service as well as land-use planning
approach to the area’s regeneration, which
neighbourhood planning was not felt to
offer. Bristol’s Neighbourhood
Partnerships in turn reflect an earlier shift
in the forms of neighbourhood
governance being encouraged by central
government, accompanied by council
policy rhetoric about deprived
communities being expected to tap into
market-led growth.2 The partnerships have
since been rebranded as evidence of
embedding localism in the city. The
council’s current attempts to manage
demand for neighbourhood planning by
offering greater support to deprived areas
in line with LDF regeneration areas
continues this market-led strategy, while
also being an attempt to compensate
partially for the areas’ likely lack of
capacity.
In Westminster, a similar pattern
emerged, where it proved easy to
de-couple the deprived-area targeted
LARPs from mainstream service delivery
after their ‘special’ funding stream was
cut.22 The subsequent successful CPC
campaign demonstrates the ability of a
well-organised, committed community to
circumvent the dominance of local policy
direction towards neighbourhood
planning, illustrating that the coalition’s
localism has to an extent compromised
local government power by the
devolution of power to civil society
actors. The council has since
pragmatically expressed support for the
CPC, framed in terms of the localism
agenda. But central government’s role in
validating neighbourhood-level efforts,
circumventing local government via the
awarding of a Neighbourhood
Community Budget, highlights that,
along with the ‘front runners’, the long
heritage of central government
experimentation at the neighbourhood
level continues.
But tensions are likely to arise, given
the political strategy of the coalition’s
form of localism, which presupposes
‘natural’ localities in which needs can be
agreed and met through local agency, and
under which variation in service provision
is presented as an outcome of local
priorities. The CPC does not intend to
engage in service delivery itself, but wants
to continue to influence local services as it
did through neighbourhood management.
Indeed, in all the examples examined, the
emphasis remained on participation (by
influencing services) rather than
independent community action (through
self-help behaviours). In Bristol, a council
officer did not think that ‘any of my [NF]
groups … are at the stage of thinking we
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want to deliver services. They’re not in
that place.’ This shows not only the
persistence of embedded practices, but the
profound difficulties of substituting
self-help for government-led service
provision, and the lack of concrete ways to
implement the rhetoric of small state
localism in forms of neighbourhood
governance. While CPCs do present an
option for urban neighbourhoods with
regeneration needs, this form of
governance is easier to establish in rural
areas with well-defined communities. A
CPC’s wide range of powers and right to
be consulted means that much depends on
the enthusiasm and abilities of the clerk
and members, as well as relationships with
the local authority.
Overall, local government’s role in the
emergent forms and reconfiguration of
existing forms of neighbourhood
governance affirmed its role at least as
‘community network coordinator’,36 albeit
within the bounds set by central
government’s brand of localism. But
concerns about the ongoing viability of
such a role, given ‘the very limited amount
of hard power in terms of coercion and
material incentive that local government
can exercise’,36 are also validated,
particularly in the absence of local
government ability to ameliorate inequity
and ongoing funding cuts. The intention
of Queen’s Park CPC to continue to
influence service provision runs ‘the risk
of surfacing the incapacity of local
authorities to respond to local community
expectations and grievances’.37 But it has a
significant advantage over an NF structure
in terms of regeneration, given that it is
now an ongoing endeavour, anchored by
its precept funding mechanism, and able in
theory at least to undertake a wide range
of activities, although its capacities to do
so will be bounded by its abilities to
fundraise and lobby effectively. While such
deprived communities may have strong
and useful stores of bonding social capital,
more affluent communities are more likely
to be able to draw on bridging and indeed
linking forms of social capital with higher
tier agencies,38 through which they can
exert pressure to secure better quality
services or oppose unwanted
developments. But both CPCs and NFs
face a real challenge in securing an active
membership fully representative of the
local community, which can be sustained
in the long term.
CONCLUSION
The shift from the redistributive ‘big state’
to the less-focused ‘small state’ variant of
localism, which relies on community
organisation, retains the neighbourhood as
a policy locus, but with few if any
additional resources. Bristol’s NDC had
£50m over ten years. Its Neighbourhood
Partnerships now have some say over the
elements of council budgets which have
been devolved. One of Westminster’s four
LARP areas has managed to replace its
initiative funding with a Council Tax
precept to be paid by its residents. In both
cities, the emergent NFs had no funding
support except for a small ‘front runner’
allocation from central government. And
the context is a period of austerity, with a
27 per cent cut in local government
funding heralded by the 2010
Comprehensive Spending Review.
That the two emerging forms of
neighbourhood governance are voluntary
and receive no additional government
funding means that better organised and
more affluent communities are more
likely to pursue their development. The
forms differ significantly in their design
and purpose. Neighbourhood Forums
constitute an additional tier to the
planning system that does not fit the
ethos of small state localism, making the
planning system more complex and
impenetrable. While both cities have seen
much voluntary activity regarding the
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formation of NFs, residents may become
disillusioned when they realise the
limitations of NDPs, such as their need
to conform with LDFs and their limited
opportunity to affect service delivery.
Moreover, NFs may have only a limited
impact on neighbourhood regeneration,
particularly as the most deprived areas
may lack market interest and
development opportunities (which in
turn would generate CIL income). The
creation of CPCs could encapsulate
future direction if government ambitions
to encourage their creation are realised, as
evident in moves to consider how NFs
can subsequently become CPCs.39 This
would increase self-reliance, the notion
that needs can be agreed and met
through local agency, with residents in
deprived communities being expected to
pay for their services. But in the example
examined, inertia is evident, given the
focus on neighbourhood
management-style service influencing
rather than the more transformative
responses associated with self-help, such
as gaining assets and engaging in service
delivery (via the Community Rights to
Buy and Challenge enabled under the
Localism Act). It is understandable that
change is incremental, and continued
empirical research is needed to ascertain
how small state localism plays out in
different communities.
What is clear is that these dual forms of
governance, where pursued, will absorb a
lot of community time in establishing
neighbourhood democracy, arguably
distracting from the context of declining
central and local government services and
budgets previously taken for granted. The
potential of these forms to promote
neighbourhood regeneration seems
limited. At present, the powers available to
neighbourhoods are weak, and there is
little central guidance or support. Civil
Parish Councils may become influential
with various service providers, and in the
longer term could pursue transformative
self-help behaviours. But this is more
likely to happen in better organised areas
with expertise and political skills sufficient
to become expert at lobbying. Such areas
tend to be more affluent, though the
presence of activists from previous
deprived neighbourhood initiatives may
sustain activity, as has been seen in
Queen’s Park. Overall, however, the
prospects seem to be for greater polarity
and the further containment of deprived
neighbourhoods.
While the coalition’s policies ‘show
traces of an ideological commitment to
localism’, its small state variant is a product
of ‘savage public spending cuts and the
need to externalise responsibility for
performance failure’ as much as ‘a
principled commitment to more
autonomous local governance’.21
Localism’s current incarnation serves as a
smokescreen for cuts and economic
recession, and developments in
neighbourhood governance appear
tokenistic. Reduced funding for local
services increases the imperative to self
help, while rights to a local ‘voice’ remain
limited and the emerging governance
forms provide little scope to influence
(declining) local services and (still
centralised) planning decisions. This is
especially the case in neighbourhoods
with regeneration needs that are likely to
lack the requisite capacities, particularly
stores of linking social capital through
which pressure can be exerted to realise
community preferences.
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